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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, Frank Serafini challenges his conviction 
and sentence for one count of perjury in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1623 (1994).1 Serafini, a popular state legislator in 
northeastern Pennsylvania, was convicted based on his 
false testimony before a federal grand jury; the grand jury 
was investigating a scheme wherein corporate political 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal criminal case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction over the appeal from 
the final judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(2), with the exception of the government's 
challenge to the District Court's recommendation as to the location of 
Serafini's imprisonment; as explained below, see infra pp. 30-31, we 
conclude that we have no jurisdiction over the challenge to the 
recommendation of a place of confinement. 
 
                                2 
  
contributions were funneled through thir d-party conduits 
in violation of federal election laws. In his grand jury 
testimony, Serafini had denied that he was r eimbursed for 
a contribution he had made to Senator Bob Dole's 
presidential campaign. In seeking to overtur n his 
conviction, Serafini maintains on appeal that (1) the 
prosecutor's questioning before the grand jury was 
insufficiently precise to support a perjury conviction; (2) the 
District Court was wrong to strike only one aspect of 
Serafini's indictment, but should instead have dismissed 
the indictment in full; (3) the government's purported 
failure to disclose during discovery that its key witness had 
been re-immunized violated Serafini's due pr ocess rights; 
(4) the District Court erred in several evidentiary rulings, 
most notably in admitting a digital recor ding of Serafini's 
grand jury testimony and in admitting documentary 
evidence and live testimony concerning other people's 
participation in the scheme; and (5) the gover nment's 
evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. 
Serafini also challenges his ten-month split sentence,2 
arguing that the District Court had no basis for a three- 
level enhancement for "substantial interfer ence with the 
administration of justice." See U.S.S.G.S 2J1.3(b)(2).3 The 
government cross-appeals Serafini's sentence, contesting 
both the fact and the extent of the District Court's three- 
level downward departure for exceptional civic or charitable 
contributions pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5H1.11. The 
government also challenges the District Court's 
recommendation as to where Serafini's sentence should be 
served, arguing that the facility recommended is not a 
proper location for "imprisonment" under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 
We conclude that Serafini received a fair trial in all 
respects and will affirm his conviction. We further conclude 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court sentenced Serafini tofive months' imprisonment 
and five months' house arrest as a condition of supervised release. The 
District Court recommended that the Bur eau of Prisons designate the 
Catholic Social Services of Lackawanna County Residential Program as 
the location for the imprisonment portion of the sentence. 
 
3. All references in this opinion ar e to the version of the Sentencing 
Guidelines that became effective November 1, 1998. 
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that the District Court's enhancement and downwar d 
departure were not an abuse of its discr etion, but that its 
confinement recommendation was subject to question. We 
will nonetheless affirm Serafini's sentence. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History4  
 
Serafini was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury 
that was investigating possible violations of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA), 2 U.S.C. SS 431-456.5 The 
principal targets of the probe wer e Renato Mariani, 
president of Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (Empire), and 
Serafini's nephew, Michael Serafini. The appar ent violations 
were that Michael Serafini6 and his secretary had solicited 
numerous employees, business associates, and family 
members to make $1,000 contributions to Senator Bob 
Dole's presidential campaign, and that Michael reimbursed 
them for these contributions;7 the resulting transactions 
between Michael and these "conduits" ther efore allegedly 
violated FECA. See 2 U.S.C. S 441f ("No person shall make 
a contribution in the name of another person or knowingly 
permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution 
. . . ."). 
 
Serafini allegedly had a close and longstanding 
connection with Michael and with Empire, a landfill located 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because Serafini was convicted after a jury trial, we must defer to the 
jury's verdict and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government. See United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 
1999). Therefore, we recount the government's version of the facts. 
 
5. FECA prohibits corporations from making contributions in connection 
with any federal election. See 2 U.S.C.S 441b(a). FECA also makes it 
unlawful for any person to make a contribution in the name of another 
person (referred to in this opinion as a"conduit"), or for any person to 
permit his or her name to be used as a conduit. See id. S 441f. FECA 
limits individual contributions to federal candidates to $1,000 per 
election per candidate. See id. S 441a(a)(1)(A). 
 
6. Throughout this opinion, we will use the name "Serafini" to refer to 
Frank Serafini, and "Michael" to refer to Michael Serafini. 
 
7. Michael was in turn reimbursed by an Empire corporate check signed 
by Renato Mariani. See Gov't Suppl. A. at 48 (chart detailing the flow of 
the contributions and reimbursement checks). 
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in Pennsylvania. At the time of the events in question, 
approximately 80 to 90 percent of the waste dumped at 
Empire originated from out of state, see A. at 1737-38, but 
legislation was pending in the United States Senate that 
would have prohibited or restricted the importation of out- 
of-state waste, see A. at 1784. Empir e lobbied Senator 
Dole, the Senate majority leader, to alter or block this 
legislation. See A. at 1798-1804. Serafini had both personal 
and financial connections to Empire: his nephew Michael 
was Empire's second-in-command, and Serafini was himself 
a 50 percent owner of a family partnership that had sold 
Empire the land on which it operated and that r eceived a 
$1.50 royalty for each ton of waste disposed at Empire. See 
A. at 1711, 1897, 2484, 2798, 3442-46, 3606. Serafini's 
landfill royalty income formed the vast majority of his total 
income; his annual royalties in 1995-97 ranged from 
slightly over $800,000 to nearly $1.1 million. See A. at 
1322, 1324, 1326. Serafini allegedly played a r ole in 
Empire's lobbying activities; he wrote a letter in 1986 to the 
former U.S. Attorney requesting investigation of a 
Congressman whom Serafini claimed was "holding up a 
permit" for Empire, see A. at 3439, and he also joined 
Michael and other Empire officials on a lobbying trip to 
Washington, D.C. in 1995, see A. at 1644-46. 
 
Serafini was called before the grand jury to answer 
questions about Michael's having solicited Serafini for a 
$1,000 contribution and allegedly having reimbursed him 
for that contribution. When he first appear ed before the 
grand jury, Serafini invoked his Fifth Amendment rights 
and was excused. See A. at 226-27. The gover nment then 
sought and received an order immunizing Serafini so that 
the government could compel his testimony before the 
grand jury; the resulting subpoena order ed him to produce 
"[a]ll documents relative to political contributions you were 
reimbursed for." A. at 234. During Serafini's appearance 
before the grand jury, the Assistant U.S. Attor ney informed 
him that he could be prosecuted if he pr ovided false 
testimony. See A. at 326. Although Serafini did 
acknowledge that Michael had solicited and obtained from 
him a $1,000 contribution to Dole, see A. at 339, he denied 
that a $2,000 check given to him by Michael that same 
week was in part a reimbursement for that contribution. 
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Instead, Serafini maintained that the $2,000 pr obably 
represented Michael's reimbursing Serafini for payments 
that Serafini made to a mechanic who had fixed Michael's 
Porsche.8 The following excerpts from Serafini's grand jury 
testimony formed the predicate for his subsequent 
indictment for perjury:9 
 
       Statement 1: 
 
       Q: And did you bring any documents pursuant to the 
       subpoena that required your appearance her e 
       today? 
 
       A: I don't have the documents, I don't have 
       documents with me but the subpoena, because the 
       subpoena didn't require any. The way I r ead the 
       subpoena, I have a copy of it, all documents 
       relative to political contributions you wer e 
       reimbursed for, and I was not r eimbursed for any 
       contributions. 
 
A. at 327-28 (emphasis added). 
 
       Statement 2: 
 
       Q: Well, then why wouldn't he reimburse you for your 
       Dole contribution under the same rationale? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. At the time of Serafini's testimony befor e the grand jury, the 
government did not know why Michael's r eimbursement check to 
Serafini had been for $2,000 rather than $1,000. The government later 
had grounds to believe that the second $1,000 r epresented 
reimbursement for a $1,000 contribution that Serafini's legislative aide, 
Thomas Harrison, had made to the Dole campaign. Serafini had 
reimbursed Harrison, and so Michael's check to Serafini apparently 
served to reimburse Serafini both for Serafini's own contribution and for 
that made by Harrison. 
 
9. These questions and responses are r eproduced here verbatim, except 
that they have been numbered so that they need not be repeated 
throughout this opinion. We will r efer to these statements as "Statement 
1," etc. Statements 1, 2, 4, and 5 appear as they did in the redacted 
transcript of Serafini's grand jury testimony; because Statement 3 was 
eventually stricken in part from the redacted version, it appears here as 
it did in the original transcript. See infra pp. 10, 11-12 (describing why 
Statement 3 was not included in the final perjury indictment). 
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       A: Because I wanted to contribute to Bob Dole. 
 
       Q: And you didn't want to fix his car? 
 
       A: Not necessarily -- 
 
       Q: Oh, I see. 
 
       A: -- would you? 
 
       Q: I don't know. 
 
       A: And $2,000 for a thousand dollar contribution. 
 
       Q: $2,000 for what? 
 
       A: $2,000 -- 
 
       Q: What was that last statement? 
 
       A: $2,000 this check is for, if I see it correctly? 
 
       Q: Right. 
 
       A: And my check here is for a thousand dollar 
       contribution? 
 
       Q: Right. So you are saying you don't know what the 
       other thousand dollars is for? 
 
       A: I would not relate it to that --  
 
       Q: What would you relate? 
 
       A: -- in my mind. 
 
       Q: What would you relate it for? 
 
       A: To something else, whether it wasfixing his car, 
       whether it is something else. It could be something 
       else and that's just what I am saying to you now, 
       because when he asked me for a thousand dollar 
       contribution I wrote a check for a thousand 
       dollars, I found no problem with that, I was 
       delighted, I was happy to be able to do it. 
 
A. at 349-350 (emphasis added). 
 
       Statement 3: 
 
       Q: Is there any check that you received that 
       reimbursed you other than that $2,000 check for 
       your contribution? 
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       A: No. 
 
       Q: Is there another check that you ar e aware of that 
       is connected to this investigation, to this Dole 
       contribution, other than the $2,000? 
 
       A: Not other than what you have shown me today, no. 
 
A. at 296 (emphasis added). 
 
       Statement 4: 
 
       Q: And you have no knowledge, as you sit her e today, 
       or is it accurate that as you sit here today you 
       have no knowledge why Michael issued that check 
       to you for $2,000? 
 
       A: I still think the $2,000 would have been just around 
       the time that I was fixing his car, the transmission 
       was gone, I was fixing it, it is just about that 
       amount of money that would have paid for the 
       repair. It could have been for a number of things, 
       but it certainly does not relate to me contributing to 
       Bob Dole. I contribute quite frequently to 
       candidates and those kind of amounts. 
 
A. at 359-360 (emphasis added). 
 
       Statement 5: 
 
       Q: I am going to wrap this up. I want to make sur e we 
       are absolutely on the same page here, ther e is no 
       misunderstanding. It is your testimony under 
       oath, as you sit here today, that as far as you're 
       concerned, as far as you know, there is no 
       connection between the check that you wrote to 
       Dole for President dated April 27th of '95 for 
       $1,000, check 3781, and the check that you 
       received from the Michael Serafini-Melinda 
       Marcotte account dated April 25th of '95 for 
       $2,000, it is your testimony that there is no 
       connection between these two items? 
 
       A: In my mind I can honestly say that ther e is no 
       connection between those two checks, the thousand 
       and the two thousand. In my, I mean in my mind 
       I know I contributed to Bob Dole because I wanted 
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       to contribute to him without reimbursement. The 
       $2,000, I truly believe I cashed that check and 
       spent it to, for another reason, I am assuming it 
       was when I was fixing his vehicle. 
 
A. at 371-72 (emphasis added). About a week after 
Serafini's appearance before the grand jury, Serafini's 
legislative aide, Thomas Harrison, testified in fr ont of the 
grand jury. See Gov't Suppl. A. at 82-122. When the 
prosecutor confronted Harrison with a r ecently discovered 
reimbursement check drawn on Serafini's account and 
deposited to Harrison's, Harrison admitted that Serafini 
had solicited and reimbursed Harrison for his Dole 
contribution, see id. at 87-88, and that he[Harrison] had 
previously lied to FBI agents and to the grand jury about 
this contribution in order to "protect Frank and kind of 
insulate him from this," A. at 2631. See also A. at 2670-71; 
Gov't Suppl. A. at 97. 
 
Based on Harrison's statements and other evidence 
resulting from the investigation, the grand jury indicted 
Serafini for perjury. Serafini moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the basis that the grand jury questioning 
was insufficiently precise to support a perjury allegation. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, Chief Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, dismissed 
the portion of the indictment that was based on Statement 
3, finding that the grand jury questioning with r egard to 
Serafini's awareness of other checks in the contribution 
scheme "was so ambiguous and unclear as to pr eclude a 
perjury conviction." A. at 5 (Dist. Ct. Mem. Op., Apr. 7, 
1998). However, the District Court denied the motion to 
dismiss the indictment in all other respects. 10 
 
The case proceeded to trial. At trial, Michael did not 
testify. The government presented as its principal evidence 
Harrison's testimony regarding his transactions with 
Serafini; the testimony of other "conduits" describing their 
own transactions with Michael and with other Empir e 
officials; and a series of 34 checks, all fr om the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The government filed an interlocutory appeal of the District Court's 
dismissal of the indictment insofar as it related to Statement 3, and we 
affirmed. See United States v. Serafini 
              , 167 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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sequence of checks, showing reimbursements paid by 
Michael to Serafini and to the other conduits. The 
government also introduced evidence r elating generally to 
Serafini's financial and personal relationship with Michael 
and with Empire. The jury convicted Serafini of perjury. 
Chief Judge Vanaskie then sentenced Serafini to the ten- 
month split sentence described above. See supra  note 2. 
Serafini now appeals his conviction and sentence. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. The Validity of the Indictment 
 
Serafini asserts two challenges to the validity of his 
indictment: first, that the prosecutor's questioning of him 
before the grand jury was impermissibly vague, and second, 
that the District Court's dismissal of the portion of the 
indictment concerning Statement 3 should have led to its 
dismissal of the entire indictment. We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court's denial of the motion to 
dismiss the indictment. See United States v. Serafini, 167 
F.3d 812, 819 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
For the first proposition, Serafini r elies on Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973), in which the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be 
convicted of perjury for giving misleading, nonr esponsive, 
but literally true answers to the prosecutor's questions. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that it is incumbent upon the 
questioner to frame sufficiently precise questions: 
 
       [T]he perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor 
       the statute invoked simply because a wily witness 
       succeeds in derailing the questioner -- so long as the 
       witness speaks the literal truth. The burden is on the 
       questioner to pin the witness down to the specific 
       object to the questioner's inquiry. 
 
Id. at 361. Serafini claims that he did not understand the 
central concept of "reimbursement" in the same way that 
the prosecutor did; Serafini says that he did not believe the 
check from Michael to constitute "reimbursement," 
because, he, Serafini, would have given money to Dole in 
any event, regardless of whether Michael paid him back for 
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the contribution. Therefore, Serafini ar gues, the questions 
put to him were vague and his answers cannot form the 
basis for a perjury conviction. This assertion is without 
merit. Serafini's attempts to transform the common term 
"reimbursement" into a technical ter m whose meaning 
would escape a sophisticated state legislator ar e unavailing.11 
Furthermore, Serafini's statements before the grand jury go 
far beyond a denial of "reimbursement." In Statement 2, 
Serafini said that he would "not relate" the $2,000 check to 
his $1,000 check for Dole, but would relate it"[t]o 
something else, whether it was fixing his car , whether it is 
something else." Statement 4 fleshes out Serafini's 
assertion that the $2,000 check was related to the car 
expenditures, "but . . . certainly does not relate to me 
contributing to Bob Dole." Statement 5 is per haps the most 
specific: "In my mind I can honestly say that there is no 
connection between those two checks, the thousand and 
the two thousand." These answers, unlike those at issue in 
Bronston, were directly r esponsive to the prosecutor's 
questions and clearly stated that there was absolutely no 
connection between the check for the Dole campaign and 
the check received from Michael. These unambiguous 
questions and responses are sufficient to form the basis for 
a perjury indictment. 
 
We also reject the argument that the rest of the 
indictment should have been dismissed merely because the 
portion relating to Statement 3 was dismissed. The 
questioning for Statement 3 was vague as to exactly which 
checks were being discussed; the questions and answers in 
Statements 1, 2, 4, and 5 simply do not relate to the issue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Webster's Third New Inter national Dictionary defines 
"reimbursement" as "the action of reimbursing" and "reimburse" as"to 
pay back (an equivalent for something taken, lost, or expended) to 
someone." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1914 (1961). The District 
Court noted the straightforward nature of the dictionary definition, and 
continued: "As it is used in its common parlance, reimbursement means 
the delivery of money to a person to pay back that person for money that 
the person expended for some matter." A. at 23 (Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. Apr. 
7, 1998). 
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of other checks, and, as we have already noted, do not 
suffer from ambiguity.12 
 
We will therefore affirm the District Court's denial of 
Serafini's motion to dismiss the indictment. 
 
B. Disclosure of Harrison's Immunity 
 
Serafini claims that the government committed a due 
process violation during discovery by not disclosing the fact 
that Harrison had been "re-immunized" fr om prosecution 
before his second grand jury appearance. Serafini cites the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Brady v. Maryland and Giglio 
v. United States as support for the contention that evidence 
of this type must be disclosed. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating that due process r equires the 
government to disclose material exculpatory evidence upon 
the defendant's request); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 154-55 (1972) (stating that the government's failure to 
disclose a promise of immunity made to a critical witness 
constituted a due process violation, because evidence of an 
agreement as to immunity was relevant to the witness's 
credibility). Serafini claims that the gover nment failed to 
disclose that Harrison was immunized from pr osecution for 
perjury, see Serafini Br. at 41, and asserts that defense 
counsel's cross examination of Harrison at trial would have 
been different in content and appr oach had the defense 
been aware of this renewed immunity. 
 
The problem with Serafini's claim is that the purported 
"re-immunization" consists of nothing mor e than the 
following exchange in the transcript of Harrison's second 
appearance before the grand jury: 
 
       Q: Now, as it was the last time, you are testifying here 
       today under an order of immunity signed by Judge 
       Vanaskie, which requires you to testify despite the 
       existence of any constitutional privilege against self 
       incrimination. That order compels you to testify on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Serafini's citation to United States v. D'Alessio, 822 F. Supp. 1134 
(D.N.J. 1993), a case in which the counts of the indictment were very 
difficult to disentangle, and in which ther e was considerable confusion 
as to whether the underlying behavior was criminal under New Jersey 
law, is therefore inapposite. 
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       the condition that your testimony may not be used 
       against you in a criminal case. You do not have 
       immunity from perjury or making false statements 
       in your testimony today, do you understand? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: If you commit perjury, or make a false statement, 
       you can be prosecuted for that perjury or false 
       statement despite the grant of immunity and your 
       testimony here today could be used against you in 
       the prosecution, do you understand? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
Gov't Suppl. A. at 85. This exchange makes it clear that 
Harrison's immunity extended only to the underlying 
conduct about which he testified; Harrison was not 
immune from a subsequent perjury prosecution in the 
event that his statements in his second appearance before 
the grand jury proved to be false. Serafini does not contest 
the government's assertion that the gover nment turned 
over the grand jury transcript to defense counsel two weeks 
before trial -- well before the time that Brady or Giglio 
would require. See Gov't Br . at 38; Serafini Reply Br. at 36. 
Because Serafini has not offered evidence of any promises 
of immunity to Harrison made outside the grand jury  
proceedings,13 we can find no discovery violation on this 
record. 
 
C. Evidentiary Rulings 
 
1. Digital Recording 
 
Serafini contends that the District Court abused its 
discretion by permitting the gover nment to play for the jury 
a digital recording of a redacted version of Serafini's grand 
jury testimony.14 The story of the history and chain of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Serafini quotes an excerpt from the government's sentencing 
memorandum, see A. at 3701-02, as support for the assertion that 
Harrison was given blanket immunity -- even fr om perjury at his second 
grand jury appearance or at his trial appearance. W e conclude that 
Serafini reads more into the prosecutor's offhand use of the word "re- 
immunization" than is reasonable given the clear record evidence in the 
case. 
14. We review the District Court's decisions as to the admissibility of 
evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 
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custody of this recording -- from"original tapes" of the 
grand jury testimony, to the "redacted tapes," to the "digital 
version" of these tapes -- is quite complex. However, the 
relevant facts for our purposes can be succinctly stated. 
 
Serafini argues on appeal that the District Court should 
not have admitted the digital version of the tapes, because 
(1) the digital version was not individually authenticated 
and offered in evidence; and (2) the digital version differs 
materially from the original version. Serafini cites the report 
of defense expert James B. Reames; Reames concluded that 
the redacted copy of the tape contained "severe distortion of 
the spoken words" as compared to the original tape. A. at 
3413. The problem with Serafini's argument is that 
Reames's objections are directed at the r edacted version, 
not the digital version, and it is the digital version's content 
that is the issue presented to us. The r ecording -- which 
turned out to be the digital recor ding -- was offered in 
evidence without objection from Serafini, see A. at 1300. 
Even if we accept defense counsel's contention that he 
thought the recording being played at trial was the redacted 
and not the digital version, the lack of objection at trial 
waived any subsequent objection to the r edacted version, 
thus obviating the relevance of Reames' r eport.15 
 
As for the digital version, we have no basis for concluding 
that there were material differ ences between it and the 
redacted tape. The trial judge compared all three versions 
of the audio recordings, and could not discern any material 
differences among the versions. See  A. at 3082-84.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
193, 199 (3d Cir. 1992). To the extent that these rulings were based on 
an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, our review 
is plenary. See id. 
 
15. Serafini apparently does not appeal the evidentiary ruling insofar as 
it held that the redacted version was authentic and admissible. Even if 
we were to construe Serafini's appellate briefs as raising a challenge to 
the authenticity of the redacted tape, his lack of objection at trial 
means 
that we could review the District Court's ruling only for plain error, see 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), and we find no plain error. 
 
16. It is worth noting that both parties agr eed to Chief Judge Vanaskie's 
suggestion that he would listen to the tapes to assess whether he could 
notice a difference among the thr ee versions, and would determine 
whether a hearing was necessary based on his assessment. See A. at 
2794-95, 3068-69, 3070-73. 
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Serafini levels a broad challenge but fails to point to any 
specific differences between the r edacted and the digital 
versions. In fact, he maintains that he was unable to tell 
from the playing of the recording at trial that it was not the 
redacted version. See Serafini Br . at 22. 
 
We find, therefore, that even if the District Court erred in 
its decision to play the digital rather than the r edacted 
version of the recording, it did not af fect Serafini's 
substantial rights, and was thus harmless. See Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 
1976); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 
(1967). 
 
2. Conduit Evidence 
 
Serafini argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in admitting evidence of the conversations and 
the transfer of funds in transactions that involved other 
"conduits" like Serafini -- i.e., other people through whom 
Michael and Empire funneled contributions -- but did not 
involve Serafini himself. The evidence admitted by the 
District Court consisted of reimbursement checks and 
conduit witnesses' testimony as to the conversations. These 
conduit conversations fall into two categories: those to 
which Michael was a party, and those to which he was not. 
The District Court admitted testimony in both categories. 
 
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the checks that wer e in the same 
series of checks as the check issued to Serafini, nor in 
admitting the testimony as to the conversations that 
involved Michael. In order to prove that Serafini had 
committed perjury, the government was r equired to 
demonstrate the falsity of Serafini's claim that the check he 
received from Michael was not a reimbursement. See A. at 
695-96. The fact that the Serafini check was one in a series 
of apparent reimbursement checks was r elevant to this 
requirement. Michael's previous actions were relevant to 
show that Michael, one of the parties to the transaction 
involving Serafini, understood it as a reimbursement. 
Serafini argues that even if the checks wer e admissible, the 
conversations were inadmissible hearsay. W e conclude that 
the conversations in which Michael was involved wer e 
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admissible under the hearsay exception provided by Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(3),17 as evidence of Michael's state of 
mind at the time of the conversations. Michael's state of 
mind during these conduit transactions was r elevant to 
show that he intended his check to Serafini to be a 
reimbursement (as he did with the other conduits); this 
evidence tends to support an inference that it was Michael's 
general practice to reimburse contributors for their 
contributions, and thus that the check to Serafini was in 
fact a reimbursement. 
 
The admission of the conduit conversations that did not 
involve Michael had a far more attenuated connection to 
Serafini's guilt. We find some merit to Serafini's contentions 
that these were of marginal relevance and were 
inadmissible as hearsay. However, the evidence contained 
in these conduit conversations was almost wholly 
cumulative of the evidence contained in those conversations 
that did involve Michael, which, as described above, were 
properly admitted into evidence. We ther efore find that the 
error, if any, in admitting the r emaining conduit 
conversations did not affect Serafini's substantial rights, 
and was therefore harmless.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in determining, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, that the 
probative value of these conversations, and of the checks, was not 
substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect -- a determination to 
which we must give "substantial deference." Hurley v. Atlantic City Police 
Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999). We note also that the District 
Court properly gave a cautionary instruction to limit the danger of unfair 
prejudice. See A. at 3337-38 (District Court's statement that the jury 
could not consider the conduit evidence to establish Serafini's 
knowledge). 
 
18. Serafini also raises challenges to other evidentiary decisions made by 
the District Court, including the exclusion of hearsay concerning the 
purported car repairs, and the admission of (1) evidence concerning 
Serafini's financial stake in Empire; (2) evidence that Empire paid 
Serafini's counsel fees; (3) portions of the agr eement to sell Empire; 
(4) 
a letter Serafini wrote to his Congressman concerning Empire; and (5) 
evidence as to Serafini's involvement in Empir e lobbying. We find no 
error in the District Court's rulings or its r easoning on these matters, 
and will affirm these evidentiary rulings. 
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D. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Serafini's final objection to his conviction is that the 
government's evidence was legally insufficient to support a 
conviction for perjury. The burden on a defendant who 
raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
extremely high. "We determine whether there is substantial 
evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to 
convict." United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 238 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 410 (3d Cir . 1995)). 18 U.S.C. 
S 1623(a) provides: 
 
       Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, 
       verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as 
       permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States 
       Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court 
       or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes 
       any false material declaration or makes or uses any 
       other information, including any book, paper , 
       document, record, recording, or other material, 
       knowing the same to contain any false material 
       declaration, shall be fined under this title or 
       imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
 
Serafini's argument that the evidence is insufficient rests 
primarily on the fact that the evidence presented 
concerning Serafini's state of mind was cir cumstantial in 
nature. However, we have recognized that intent and 
knowledge may be proven via circumstantial evidence. See 
United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1992); see 
also United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1280 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) ("[P]erjury cases . . . ar e susceptible to proof by 
circumstantial evidence, and in fact ar e peculiarly likely to 
be proven in this manner because one of the elements of 
the crime is that the defendant knew his statement was 
false when he made it."). Viewing the evidence in this case 
in the light most favorable to the government, we find that 
the evidence -- including but not limited to Harrison's 
testimony, Serafini's grand jury testimony, and the 
admissible conduit evidence -- was easily sufficient for a 
rational factfinder to find that Serafini perjured himself in 
denying that the $2,000 check was a reimbursement for his 
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and Harrison's contributions to the Dole campaign, and in 
stating that the $2,000 had nothing to do with these 
contributions. The evidence was therefor e sufficient to 
support Serafini's conviction. 
 
E. Sentencing Issues 
 
1. Increase in Offense Level for Substantial Interference 
 
After ascertaining that the base offense level for perjury 
before a grand jury was 12, see U.S.S.G. S 2J1.3(a), the 
District Court applied a three-level enhancement for 
"substantial interference with the administration of justice," 
id. S 2J1.3(b)(2). An application note to this section of the 
Guidelines explains: 
 
       "Substantial interference with the administration of 
       justice" includes a premature or impr oper termination 
       of a felony investigation; an indictment, ver dict, or any 
       judicial determination based upon perjury, false 
       testimony, or other false evidence; or the unnecessary 
       expenditure of substantial governmental or court 
       resources. 
 
Id. S 2J1.3 (Application Note 1) (emphasis added). The 
District Court found that Serafini's perjury had caused the 
unnecessary expenditure of substantial gover nmental 
resources. 
 
The District Court identified the following expenditures of 
the government's time: re-interviewing Thomas Harrison 
after Serafini's appearance before the grand jury, calling 
Harrison to testify before the grand jury a second time, 
subpoenaing auto repair shops and PNC Bank for records, 
interviewing the owner of one auto repair company and the 
general manager of another, and interviewing Serafini's 
employee Lucille Yager and requesting Y ager's grand jury 
testimony. See A. at 3823-24. The defense ar gued that 
some of these expenditures would have been undertaken 
even in the absence of Serafini's perjury, claiming in 
particular that the government had in its possession the 
bank records showing Serafini's check to Harrison even 
before Serafini's grand jury appearance. See Serafini Br. at 
63. Serafini cites United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 522 
(2d Cir. 1990), for the proposition that a substantial 
 
                                18 
  
expenditure enhancement cannot be applied wher e the 
government already had the infor mation that the defendant 
concealed via her false statements. However, Jones is easily 
distinguished from our case. Jones r elied heavily on the 
fact that "the district court did not make any specific 
finding that Jones' perjury had resulted in any substantial 
expenditure of governmental resour ces." Id. at 521-22. 
Here, in contrast, the District Court explicitly made such 
factual findings. See A. at 3823-27 (transcript of sentencing 
hearing).19 We review the District Court's factual findings 
that the expenditures were "substantial" and that Serafini's 
perjury was a but-for cause of these expenditur es for clear 
error only, see, e.g., United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 
1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1997), and we find no such error. We 
therefore conclude that the enhancement for "substantial 
interference" was permissible. 
 
2. Downward Departure for Community and Charitable 
       Activities 
 
The offense level for perjury, adjusted by the three-level 
substantial interference enhancement, was 15. When 
combined with Serafini's criminal history category of I, this 
adjusted offense level resulted in a guideline range of 18 to 
24 months' imprisonment. However, the District Court 
granted a three-level downward departur e for Serafini's 
community and charitable activities. See A. at 3851-52. The 
government argues that the District Court's departure is an 
abuse of discretion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. In particular, the District Court explained its conclusion that the 
government would not have had to re-interview Harrison if Serafini had 
testified truthfully before the grand jury: 
 
       If Mr. Serafini had testified, truthfully, that he was, indeed, 
       reimbursed and that the other thousand dollars of the $2,000 check 
       was for Mr. Harrison, there would be no need to go see Mr. 
       Harrison, again, who was, to say the least, not the most reliable 
       witness the Government could find, under the circumstances, 
       having already lied to the Grand Jury. So Ifind that but for the 
       Defendant's perjury, it would not have been necessary to interview 
       Mr. Harrison, so that there is the r equisite causal relationship 
       between the interview and calling him to testify before the Grand 
       Jury. 
 
A. at 3824. 
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In Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), the 
Supreme Court outlined the methodology for a district 
court to use when considering a departure fr om the 
applicable guideline range. We have described the Koon 
analysis as follows: 
 
       First, identify the factor or factors that potentially take 
       the case outside the Guidelines' "heartland" and make 
       it special or unusual. Second, determine whether the 
       Guidelines forbid departures based on the factor, 
       encourage departures based on the factor , or do not 
       mention the factor at all. Third, apply the appropriate 
       rule: (1) if the factor is forbidden, the court cannot use 
       it as a basis for departure; (2) if the factor is 
       encouraged, the court is authorized to depart if the 
       applicable guideline does not already take it into 
       account; (3) if the factor is discouraged, or encouraged 
       but already taken into account by the applicable 
       guideline, the court should depart only if the factor is 
       present to an exceptional degree, or in some other way 
       makes the case different from the ordinary case in 
       which the factor is present; or (4) if the factor is 
       unmentioned, "the court must, after considering the 
       structure and theory of both relevant individual 
       guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole, decide 
       whether [the factor] is sufficient to take the case out of 
       the Guideline's heartland." 
 
United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added) (internal citations to Koon omitted). We 
also noted Koon's statement that a r eviewing court must 
give substantial deference to the district court's 
discretionary decision to depart from the guideline range. 
See id. at 227 (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 98). 
 
The District Court described the appropriate analytical 
steps and correctly determined that departing on the basis 
of civic and charitable good works was discouraged, but not 
forbidden, by the Guidelines. See A. at 3839 (transcript of 
sentencing hearing); U.S.S.G. S 5H1.11 ("Military, civic, 
charitable, or public service; employment-related 
contributions; and similar prior good works ar e not 
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence 
should be outside the applicable guideline range."). The 
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District Court recognized that, in order to depart downward 
on this basis, it must find that this factor existed "to an 
exceptional degree or, in some way, that makes the case 
different from the ordinary case in which the factor is 
present." A. at 3839. The District Court made a finding that 
Serafini's civic and charitable contributions did exist to 
such an exceptional degree, or in an extraor dinary manner. 
See id. 
 
Our review of the District Court's finding in this regard is 
quite deferential. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 ("[W]hether a 
discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departur e because 
it is present in some unusual or exceptional way, [is a] 
matter[ ] determined in large part by comparison with the 
facts of other Guidelines cases. District courts have an 
institutional advantage over appellate courts in making 
these sorts of determinations . . . "); see also United States 
v. Jones, 158 F.3d 492, 497 (10th Cir . 1998) (stating that 
appellate review "is at its most defer ential" when the court 
of appeals is evaluating "the district court's conclusion that 
the facts of this case made it atypical"). Our r eview is 
limited to ensuring that the circumstances r elied upon by 
the District Court are not "so far r emoved from those found 
exceptional in existing case law that the sentencing court 
may be said to be acting outside permissible limits." United 
States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court was 
presented with several character witnesses, and more than 
150 letters. The letters submitted to the Court fall into 
three categories: (i) the first category presents Serafini as a 
good person; (ii) the second category refers to his activities 
as a state legislator; and (iii) the thir d category refers to his 
assistance, in time and money, to individuals and local 
organizations. 
 
(i) As to the first category, these can be quickly 
dismissed with the observation that being a "good person," 
a quality indeed to be admired, does not qualify as 
extraordinary or exceptional civic or charitable conduct. 
 
(ii) As to Serafini's activities as a state legislator, they 
are work-related and political in character. For example, a 
letter from the Fire Chief of Greenfield Township Volunteer 
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Fire Company stated that he "had worked tir elessly to 
obtain grant monies to help the community af ford the 
lifesaving equipment they need." Sealed Suppl. A. at 20. 
The same letter also referred to Serafini's guidance "on 
several projects, including writing bid specifications for a 
new engine . . . and in pushing through legislation which 
allows smaller fire companies to purchase equipment 
through state funding." Id. 
 
Other letters of this nature attest to Serafini's character 
and quality of legislative service. Others ar e from grateful 
constituents who were helped by Serafini or his staff. 
Conceptually, if a public servant perfor ms civic and 
charitable work as part of his daily functions, these should 
not be considered in his sentencing because we expect such 
work from our public servants. While we might question 
whether our sentencing courts should consider such things 
as one's situation or opportunity, the methodology that 
requires us to determine "or dinary" versus "exceptional" 
and "laudable" versus "extraordinary" is a subjective one 
that involves comparing a defendant's conduct to the norm. 
Thus, to the extent this second group of letters does not 
evidence extraordinary community service under Guideline 
5H1.11, but instead, reflects merely the political duties 
ordinarily performed by public servants, we are of the view 
that they cannot form the basis of a departur e. 
 
(iii) However, unlike the first and second categories of 
letters the Court received, the third category of letters 
provided an adequate basis for the District Court's 
conclusion that Serafini's community service warranted a 
downward departure. Many of the letters that fall within 
this last group contain substantive descriptions of Serafini's 
generosity with his time as well as his money. Several 
constituents and friends described situations in which 
Serafini extended himself to them in unique and 
meaningful ways during times of serious need. In 
particular, three letters are especially noteworthy. 
 
William Drazdowski, an accountant and "a close personal 
friend" of the defendant, explains Serafini's r ole in providing 
a $300,000 guarantee to Dr. Edward Zaloga so that he 
could secure new cutting edge data from certain Tokyo 
physicians for the treatment of his brother's brain tumor. 
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Sealed Suppl. A. at 57. Dr. Zaloga testified at the 
sentencing hearing that he telephoned Serafini at 1:00 a.m. 
seeking his assistance in raising the money. Just thirty 
minutes later, Serafini called back and informed Dr. Zaloga 
"that everything was in place." The letter does not state who 
actually made the guarantee, or how it was accomplished. 
However, the clear import of Zaloga's testimony is that it 
was Serafini's money: ". . . [N]ot once did he ask me, How 
are you going to pay me back? Or any other such question. 
The simple statement, Just get the account numbers, we'll 
wire the money in the morning." A. at 3786. In reading the 
Zaloga letter, both Serafini's readiness to help and his 
reluctance to seek gratitude make a str ong impression. 
Such behavior is hardly part of the nor mal duties of a local 
politician. 
 
Another letter came from George E. Seig, who also 
testified at the sentencing hearing. Sealed Supp. A. at 186- 
89. He sustained a serious injury as a result of an accident 
while he was a college student. The physicians' pr ognosis 
was that he would never be able to carry on any for m of 
normal social functioning. After a year of frustrating 
physical therapy, Seig lost all ambition to r eturn to school. 
Then, he was contacted by Serafini's office who told him 
that Serafini had heard of the tragic incident and wanted 
Seig to come work for him. The record r eflects that 
Serafini's offer of employment went far beyond just hiring a 
young person on his staff. Serafini took Seig under his 
wing, mentored him, and strongly encouraged him to 
attend college. He even loaned him money until Seig could 
repay it. The letter from Seig -- now an attorney -- reflects 
his immense gratitude and his feeling that Serafini is 
responsible for turning his life ar ound. 
 
A third letter came from a widow who appr oached 
Serafini in tears because she was about to lose her house. 
He wrote her a personal check for $750 to for estall 
foreclosure. She expressed doubt about her future ability to 
repay him, but Serafini insisted that she need not do so 
unless she could afford it. 
 
The remaining letters, taken as a whole, depict Serafini 
as an exceptionally giving person. See Sealed Suppl. A. at 
137 (describing Serafini's having forgiven a substantial debt 
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out of concern for a divorced mother'sfinancial situation). 
For example, the letters describe Serafini's volunteer work 
as an usher at St. Mary's Church, see id.  at 35, 40, 107; 
at the Abington Heights School District, see id.  at 166; and 
at Lackawanna Trail High School, see id.  at 200. In 
addition, he helped to establish a fund to defray the cost of 
a bone marrow transplant for a man suffering from 
leukemia. See id. at 209. Several letters note that Serafini 
was generous with his time even with people who lived 
outside his district. See id. at 33, 35, 125. The letters also 
describe Serafini's financial contributions to organizations 
such as The Arc (a nonprofit agency serving people with 
mental retardation and their families), see id. at 14; the 
Rotary Run Against Drugs, see id. at 26; the Scranton- 
Lackawanna Human Development Agency, see id. at 41, 
108; the Little League, see id. at 47; the Boy Scouts, see id. 
at 109, 118; St. Francis of Assisi Kitchen, see id. at 157; 
the Abington Heights School District, see id.  at 166; and 
the leukemia sufferer's fund mentioned above, see id. at 
209.20 A letter from an official at the University of Scranton 
refers to Serafini's financial assistance to college students, 
see id. at 177, and a letter from a high school social studies 
teacher describes Serafini's contributions to a scholarship 
for graduating seniors, see id. at 200. 
 
A former employee noted in one letter that when her 
friend was sick with leukemia, Serafini did mor e than just 
permit her to take time off to visit her . He arranged a ride 
for her friend to Johns Hopkins Hospital in Maryland so 
that she could obtain a second opinion regar ding her 
condition. See id. at 215. Other letters indicating that 
Serafini went above and beyond the call of duty as a public 
servant described how he had personally financed a second 
office to enable him to reach more constituents. See id. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Several letters describe contributions to other organizations, beyond 
those listed above, in terms that indicate that the contributions may be 
either financial or nonfinancial in natur e. See Sealed Suppl. A. at 67 
(Moosic Youth Center and Moosic Lions); id. at 80 (St. Joseph's Hospital, 
the Red Cross, and the SPCA); id. at 146 (The Mental Health 
Association); id. at 190 (the Northeast Regional Cancer Institute, the 
Deutsch Institute, Easter Seals, Friends of the Poor , and the American 
Heart Association). 
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35. Additionally, there was significant testimony at the 
sentencing hearing regarding Serafini's charitable activities, 
including: giving a man several hundred dollars so his 
electricity would not be turned off, id. at 3789; paying 
mortgages, car payments, and the cost of dentur es for 
those could not afford them, id. at 3791, 3800; and helping 
a young man start his construction business, id.  at 3803. 
 
The District Court concluded that the letters and 
testimony demonstrated that Serafini had distinguished 
himself, "not by the amount of money [he has] given, but by 
the amount of time that [he has] devoted." A. at 3839. The 
District Court found that these efforts made Serafini's 
community and charitable activities "exceptional" when 
compared to what an average person in Serafini's 
circumstances would have done: 
 
       Those weren't acts of just giving money, they were acts 
       of giving time, of giving one's self. That distinguishes 
       Mr. Serafini, I think, from the or dinary public servant, 
       from the ordinary elected official, and I had ample 
       testimony, today, that says that Mr. Serafini 
       distinguishes himself, that these are acts not just 
       undertaken to assure his re-election, but are taken 
       because of the type of person he is . . . . 
 
A. at 3840. 
 
We realize, as did the District Court, that Serafini's 
largesse was in part financial, and in part, devotion of 
himself and his time. Since he is a wealthy individual, we 
must ensure that a district court does not run afoul of the 
prohibition against considering socioeconomic differences 
in relying on financial contributions as a basis for a 
departure. See U.S.S.G. S 5H1.11; see also United States v. 
Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 434 (6th Cir . 2000). However, the 
District Court here recognized this particular aspect of 
Serafini's situation, but nonetheless found all his 
contributions, not merely monetary ones, exceptional. 
 
It is not our role to decide in the first instance whether 
Serafini's civic and charitable contributions wer e 
exceptional given Serafini's role as a public servant and his 
apparent wealth. Our review is far mor e deferential. We 
conclude that the District Court had an adequate basis for 
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its factual finding, and that the District Court's decision 
was not clearly out of line with other reported cases. See, 
e.g., United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 
1998) (upholding defendant's downward departur e for 
charitable activities, which included bringing two troubled 
young women into her home and paying for them to attend 
a private high school, as well as helping to car e for an 
elderly friend, where the court found no basis to overturn 
the district court's finding that these ef forts were 
exceptional). 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir cuit in 
United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1998). 
There, the court concluded that the defendant's activities, 
which consisted of advising local business owners, hiring 
young people, serving on a church council, and raising 
money for charity, were "laudable, . . .[but] neither 
exceptional nor out of the ordinary for someone of his 
income and preeminence in a small Minnesota town with a 
population barely over a thousand." Id.  at 630. Accordingly, 
the court of appeals reversed the district court's downward 
departure. 
 
However, in Morken, the court essentially found that, 
given Morken's station in life, his contributions were not 
extraordinary. Here, the District Court was careful to view 
Mr. Serafini's activities in light of his career and resources, 
and taking that into account, found that his charitable 
activities were in fact sufficiently beyond the norm for a 
wealthy politician, and were sufficiently exceptional so as to 
warrant a departure under the Guidelines. While the 
District Court did not allude to this, we can detect here 
good works of a different nature and degree than the 
somewhat impersonal giving that was demonstrated in 
Morken. Also, we are aware that other appellate courts have 
second guessed the trial court's view of the "nor m" for good 
works performed by certain individuals, concluding that a 
certain defendant did no more than other similarly situated 
individuals. See United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 
796 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant's charitable and 
volunteer activities did not make him an atypical defendant 
in antitrust price-fixing cases); see also United States v. 
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Crouse, 145 F.3d 786, 792 (6th Cir . 1998) (finding nine- 
level downward departure unsupported by defendant's civic 
contributions, which were not unusual for a pr ominent 
businessman). These do not provide a basis forfinding an 
abuse of discretion here because, based on the evidence, 
the District Court could have found, and did find, that 
Serafini's acts of personal kindness and good works were 
above and beyond customary political or charitable giving. 
We also note that while many of Serafini's acts involved the 
giving of money, the monetary aid was only one aspect of 
otherwise charitable conduct on his part, distinguishing his 
acts from the impersonal writing of checks that is the norm 
for many wealthy individuals. By taking such giving into 
account, the District Court did not grant the departure 
based on socioeconomic conditions. We conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion byfinding that 
Serafini's civic and charitable contributions wer e 
exceptional and thus warranted a downward departure. 
 
The government also challenges the extent of the District 
Court's three-level departure, claiming that this departure 
was reached by a result-oriented and incorrect 
methodology. We do not agree. In United States v. 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), we noted that our 
scope of review over the extent of the District Court's 
discretionary departure is deferential. See id. at 1110 ("This 
[final] step involves what is quintessentially a judgment 
call. District courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh- 
and-blood defendants. . . . Therefore, appellate review must 
occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's 
superior `feel' for the case.") (quoting United States v. Diaz- 
Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1989)); see also 18 
U.S.C. SS 3742(f)(2), (f)(3) (stating that the courts of appeals 
should affirm all departures that ar e not unreasonable). 
However, in Kikumura, we outlined"objective standards to 
guide the determination of reasonableness," Kikumura, 918 
F.2d at 1110, stating that the sentence imposed must be 
"minimally sufficient to satisfy concer ns of retribution, 
general deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation," 
id. at 1111. We also observed that the appropriate way to 
meet these goals may often be determined by analogy to 
specific guidelines or to the structure of the Guidelines in 
general. See id. at 1112 ("[A]nalogy to the guidelines is also 
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a useful and appropriate tool for deter mining what offense 
level a defendant's conduct most closely appr oximates."); id. 
at 1113 ("[B]y attempting to link the extent of departure to 
the structure of the guidelines, the courts can avoid the 
kind of standardless determinations of r easonableness that 
inevitably produce unwanted disparity.") (quoting United 
States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1990)) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
The District Court heeded Kikumura's instruction to look 
to the structure of the Guidelines, but noted that it could 
not find "any particularly apt analogy" in any specific 
guideline. A. at 3851. Therefore, the District Court 
compared the mitigating effect of Serafini's charitable and 
community contributions with the sentence-enhancing 
effect of his substantial interfer ence with the 
administration of justice. The District Court concluded that 
these two effects were similar in magnitude: 
 
       And there are no other specifically-mentioned 
       adjustments, in this particular case, that pr ovides [sic] 
       a sound foundation for analogic reasoning. I do think, 
       however, that it's appropriate to look at this case as if 
       it were perjury without the enhancement, without the 
       three-level enhancement. I think that an appr opriate 
       downward departure, in this case, is thr ee levels. 
 
A. at 3851-52. In the absence of any clearly r elevant 
analogy to a specific guideline, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that the effects of the enhancement and the downward 
departure should be similar in magnitude, nor in 
concluding that the net effect was to r eturn Serafini to the 
base level of culpability for perjury -- a level 12. 
 
The government's argument that the departure was 
result-oriented is based on a single statement by the 
sentencing judge: "And I will say that I am most influenced, 
in the final decision that I make, that I have departed three 
levels, that takes me to Zone C." A. at 3852. W e find this 
statement too ambiguous to support the gover nment's 
contention that the District Court abused its discr etion. It 
is not apparent to us, from this one statement, that the 
sentencing judge meant that the reason  for his departure 
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was to arrive at Zone C of the Sentencing Table. Read in 
the entire context of the District Court's departure 
discussion, the statement is equally susceptible to a 
simpler reading: that the District Court simply found that 
the result of the three-level departure was to put Serafini in 
Zone C, not that the goal of the departur e was to put him 
in Zone C.21 
 
3. Recommendation as to Location of Confinement 
 
The government argues that the District Court erred in 
recommending to the Bureau of Prisons that the 
imprisonment portion of Serafini's service be served in the 
Catholic Social Services of Lackawanna County Residential 
Program. See A. at 3879 (District Court's judgment of 
sentence). The government asserts that such a facility 
cannot serve as the location for "imprisonment" within the 
meaning of U.S.S.G. S 5C1.1, which reads in pertinent part: 
 
       If the applicable guideline range is in Zone C of the 
       Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied 
       by -- 
 
       (1) a sentence of imprisonment; or 
 
       (2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a ter m 
       of supervised release with a condition that 
       substitutes community confinement or home 
       detention . . . provided that at least one-half of the 
       minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5C1.1(d). We agree with the government's 
reading of this portion of the Guidelines, and its view that 
the imposition of a community confinement sentence would 
violate the Guidelines. However, because the District 
Court's statement as to the place of confinement was 
merely a recommendation, i.e., was not a final order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Because we conclude that the departur e was permissible, the District 
Court was correct to calculate a guideline range of 10 to 16 months for 
Serafini, which placed Serafini in Zone C. The split sentence -- five 
months' imprisonment followed by five months' home detention -- was 
appropriate for this guideline range. See  U.S.S.G. S 5C1.1(d)(2). 
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imposed by the District Court, we conclude that we have no 
jurisdiction to review this statement.22 
 
It is true that under section S 5C1.1 of the Guidelines, 
"community confinement" cannot constitute 
"imprisonment" for purposes of fulfilling the requirement 
that one-half of a split sentence be satisfied by 
imprisonment. See United States v. Horek , 137 F.3d 1226, 
1228-29 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Adler, 52 F.3d 
20, 21 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Swigert, 18 F.3d 443, 
446 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 
892-93 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Jordan, 
734 F. Supp. 687, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1990). Ther efore, if the 
District Court had so ordered this confinement as satisfying 
the requirement for imprisonment, it would clearly be 
reversible error.23 However, we reject the government's 
contention that we can or must reverse the District Court's 
sentencing order that included a recommendation to that 
effect. The District Court recognized that the final decision 
as to the location of imprisonment was the Bur eau of 
Prisons'. See A. at 3879 (District Court's judgment of 
sentence) ("The defendant is hereby committed to the 
custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be 
imprisoned for a term of five (5) months. . . . The court 
makes the following recommendations to the Bur eau of 
Prisons: The Court recommends that the Bur eau of Prisons 
designate the Catholic Social Services of Lackawanna 
County Residential Program, Scranton, Pennsylvania, as 
the place for service of this sentence.") (emphasis added). 
Its recommendation, while erroneous, was not an order and 
is technically not reviewable. See e.g., United States v. 
Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43 (2d Cir . 1997) (per curiam). In our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Because we conclude that we have no jurisdiction over this portion 
of the government's cross-appeal, we need not reach Serafini's argument 
that the government forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the 
District Court. 
 
23. In fact, a district court has no power to dictate or impose any place 
of confinement for the imprisonment portion of the sentence. Rather, the 
power to determine the location of imprisonment rests with the Bureau 
of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. S 3621(b) ("The Bureau of Prisons shall 
designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment."); see also Jalili, 
925 
F.2d at 892. 
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view, the recommendation did not amount to the imposition 
of a community confinement sentence. The sentence the 
District Court imposed -- namely five months' 
imprisonment -- was appropriate and we will affirm it. That 
part of the order that contains the recommended place of 
imprisonment -- which would violate the guidelines if 
followed by the Bureau of Prisons -- is either beyond our 
jurisdiction, or, if reviewable as part of the order, a nullity. 
We think the former is the better analytic route. We need 
not disturb a suggestion or recommendation, and have no 
power to do so because our review is limited to a sentence 
imposed in violation of the law or imposed  as a result of an 
incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 
U.S.C. SS 3742(a)(1), (a)(2). While the gover nment correctly 
notes that the community confinement sentence, if 
imposed, would violate the law, we do not see the place of 
Serafini's commitment as having been imposed by the 
District Court, and we will not reverse the sentencing order 
on that basis because we lack jurisdiction over the District 
Court's recommendation. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the District 
Court's orders of conviction and sentence. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part and Dissenting 
in part: 
 
I concur and join with the majority except with r espect to 
Part E(2) pertaining to the Downward Departur e for 
Community and Charitable Activities. For reasons set forth 
below, I respectfully dissent from this aspect of the opinion. 
 
The trial judge tried this hard fought case skillfully, 
patiently and without error. However , I believe that when it 
came to sentencing, the voluminous letters fr om the 
defendant's political constituents, colleagues, and other 
friends misled the Court to depart downward fr om the 
Guidelines. The majority appropriately r ejects the first two 
categories of these letters but concludes that the third 
category of letters provide "an adequate basis" for the 
District Court's conclusion to depart downwar d. Maj. op. at 
22. In reaching its conclusion, the majority gives "quite 
deferential" review to the District Court's finding that 
Serafini's civic and charitable contributions did exist to an 
exceptional degree, or in an extraordinary manner. Maj. op. 
at 21. 
 
The general rule of "deference" is not without limitation: 
it has many restraints. It must be consistent with 
Congressional purpose and, in this case, the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Even in cases where administrative agencies 
enjoy much deference in interpreting their own regulations, 
Justice Jackson has stated that the weight of defer ence 
"will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, .. . , and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944), quoted affirmatively in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-142 (1976). Accor d, Daughters of 
Miriam Ctr. for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
 
Although I agree wholeheartedly that the District Court's 
sentencing finding is entitled to deference,"this deference is 
constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of 
a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and 
history." Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 
(1979) (quoted in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
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442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979)). When invoked as a guide to the 
exercise of judicial action, discretion must be sound, and 
not exercised arbitrarily or without regar d to what is right 
and equitable under the circumstances and the law. See 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
 
Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist 
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction. See Ronald Dworkin, T aking Rights Seriously 31 
(1977). Discretion, even the discretion r esting with a 
sentencing trial judge, must be restricted by the applicable 
statutory meaning, purpose and history. The United Sates 
Sentencing Guidelines, which apply here, whether we 
empathize with them or find them frustrating, ar e binding 
upon the sentencing judge and the appellate courts. See 
Mistratta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)(holding that 
the Guidelines are constitutional). Unless courts uphold the 
surrounding belt of restriction, discr etion, even the little 
discretion that remains with a judge under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, will override the parameters of statutory 
limitation. 
 
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984, 18 
U.S.C. S 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. SS 997-998 (the "Act"), the 
federal sentencing system had been "predominantly 
standardless and indeterminate." Federal Sentencing 
Manual, G.T. McFadden, J.C. Clarke, J. L. Staniels, 
S 1.01[2]. The Act created the United States Sentencing 
Commission and empowered it to promulgate guidelines 
and policy statements pertaining to sentencing decisions. 
"Those statutory changes and the guidelines have 
significantly altered the scope and natur e of judicial 
discretion." Id. at 1.01[3]. In enacting the SRA, Congress 
was concerned not only with equal punishment to offenders 
who commit crime, but also with the need to pr omote 
respect for the law and to limit judicial discr etion in 
sentencing. Id. at 1.64. 
 
The Sentencing Guidelines are clear that a defendant's 
record of charitable work and community service are a 
discouraged justification for a sentencing departure. See 
United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1324 (1st Cir. 
1994). The historical note to the Civic and Charitable 
Amendment to the Guidelines (S 5H1.11) "expresses the 
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Commission's intent that the factors set forth in this part 
are not ordinarily relevant in deter mining whether a 
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range; 
but that, unless expressly stated, these policy statements 
do not mean that the Commission views such factors as 
necessarily inappropriate to the determination of the 
sentence within the applicable guideline range." 
 
Discouraged-feature factors are not usually relevant to a 
departure decision. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. at 
95. A court may depart only if a discouraged factor is 
present to an exceptional degree or in some other way that 
makes the case different from the or dinary case where the 
factor is present. See id., at 96. Ther efore, a downward 
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines on the ground of 
community and charitable activities is only appr opriate if 
the defendant performed charitable acts to an exceptional 
degree. This appears to be a recognition that in our culture 
and society, every person is expected reasonably to 
contribute charity to the poor and to non-pr ofit 
organizations dedicated to educational, health, and 
religious purposes.1 
 
Thus, the critical question is whether the discouraged 
factor is present in this case to "an exceptional degree or in 
some other way that makes this case differ ent from the 
ordinary case where the factor is pr esent." The majority, 
relying on United States v. Jones, 158 F.3d 492 (10th Cir. 
1998) and United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 
1998), concludes that the District Court had "an adequate 
basis," maj. op at p. 27, for its departur e. In Woods, the 
District Court allowed a one level departure to a woman 
who pleaded guilty to one count of bankruptcy fraud. The 
District Court found that the defendant's money laundering 
offense fell outside the "heartland" of such cases and that 
taking two troubled young women into her own home and 
paying for them to attend a private high school warranted 
the departure. In affirming, in one paragraph of a five page 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. According to a national survey by Independent Sector on "Giving and 
Volunteering in the United States," appr oximately 69% of all households 
in the United States made voluntary contributions to charity in 1995. 
See Statistical Abstract of the United States 404 (1999). 
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opinion, the court did not even cite or discuss the Guideline 
under which it affirmed the departur e, but merely stated 
"we have no basis for holding that [the ef forts by the 
defendant] were not [exceptional]." Unlike the Woods case, 
we have a substantial record here fr om which to assess. It 
shows that Serafini's charitable works wer e not exceptional 
or extraordinary by any reasonable standar d. 
 
United States v. Jones, cited by the majority, is 
inapposite. Jones was charged with unlawfully possessing 
a firearm. The District Court r elied on eleven factors for 
departure, not merely the defendant's long history of 
community service. Among these factors were the aberrant 
nature of defendant's conduct in unlawfully possessing a 
firearm, the collateral consequences of his incarceration in 
the economically depressed community in which he lived, 
his "highly unusual" voluntary disclosur e of circumstances 
of his making a false statement to obtain the fir earm, his 
post-offense conduct, and the negative ef fect incarceration 
would have on both the quality and quantity of Jones's 
rehabilitation. See Jones, 158 F .3d at 504. The Government 
criticized the District Court's inclusion of community 
service as a factor, but as the appellate court noted, "the 
Government provides nothing in the r ecord to the 
contrary." Id. at 500-01. But, ther e is substantial evidence 
in our record to the contrary generated by Serafini himself. 
Also, Serafini suffers from an absence of the other factors 
that played a dominant role in the Jones  court's decision to 
depart. 
 
In the ordinary course of events, a taxpayer , especially 
one with substantial annual income, will specifically list 
every available charitable contribution as a tax deduction in 
his federal income tax return. Serafinifiled such returns 
and specifically claimed charitable deductions. These 
returns are the best evidence of his charitable 
contributions; they are not vague, indefinite opinions of 
friends and political constituents tendered to a sentencing 
judge in an effort to obtain a reduced sentence. The tax 
returns are concrete evidence of Serafini's charitable giving, 
and are the most logical place to begin an analysis of 
whether his charitable acts were exceptional. 
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The defendant is not only "a wealthy individual," maj. op 
at 25, but his federal income tax retur ns show substantial 
income from sources other than his salary as a state 
official. Included are substantial royalties from the Empire 
Landfill. A financial analysis of his pertinent income 
returns for the period 1991 through 1996 reveals the 
following undisputed evidence. 
 
 
YEAR    $ TOTAL INCOME    $ CHARITABLE    CHARITY AS % 
        ROUNDED           DEDUCTIONS      OF INCOME  
1991      724,019         13,407          1.8  
1993      857,000         22,604          2.6  
1994      855,000         16,620          1.9  
1995      908,172         17,385          1.9  
1996    1,101,276         20,310          1.8 
     
 
Except for 1993, in which his contributions exceeded 2%, 
all of his contributions are less than 2% per annum. 
Donating less than 2% of one's income to charity-- even 
2.6% -- is lackluster and pedestrian by any measur e; it is 
not exceptional. It is far below the average measur e of 
giving in the United States by people in the defendant's 
socioeconomic status.2 
 
Serafini's charitable contributions of his annual income 
is ordinary at best when compared to national figures. It 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the average 
American household contributed 2.2% of its income to charity in 1991. 
See Statistical Abstract of the United States 404 (1999). In 1993, the 
average was 2.1%. See id. In 1995, the average was 2.2%. See id. In 
1995, households with greater than $100,000 income contributed 3.4% 
of their household income to charity. See id.  According to a 1999 report 
by the Independent Sector, of the American households that gave to 
charity, in 1998, they contributed 2.1% of their income; in 1995, 2.2% 
was contributed; in 1993, 2.1% was contributed; in 1991, 2.2% was 
contributed; in 1989, 2.5% was contributed, and in 1987, 1.9% was 
contributed. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 391 (1997); 
http://www.independentsector.or g/GandV/s_keyf.htm>>. 
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pales in comparison to tithing, the practice in many 
religious organizations of giving ten per cent of one's income 
to one's religious institution. Serafini's charitable 
contributions are extraordinarily low  when considering that 
many religious institutions throughout history have 
encouraged charitable giving in addition to the tithe. See 
Carl Bakal, Charity USA 21 (1979). 
 
Serafini appears to have made many appearances at 
public events, but he did not contribute money or r esources 
according to his means. He has helped some people with 
small debts, cost of indentures, and other acts of kindness, 
but he never paid out any exceptional amount of money. 
The District Court was sensitive to this; it observed that the 
defendant had distinguished himself "not by the amount of 
money [he has] given, but by the amount of time that [he 
has] devoted." Maj. Op. at 25. 
 
As noted, the majority and the District Court wer e 
persuaded by Serafini's non-financial charitable acts. But 
much of Serafini's civic participation was either honorary or 
obligatory because of his job as a Representative. 
Numerous letters submitted on his behalf wer e written by 
constituents or other beneficiaries of his public position. 
The majority finds three letters noteworthy. Maj. Op. at 22. 
One comes from William Drazdowski, "a close personal 
friend," which explains defendant's role in providing a 
$300,000 guarantee to Dr. Edward Zaloga to enable him to 
obtain new medical data from Tokyo physicians for the 
treatment of his brother's brain tumor . The doctor testified 
that thirty minutes after a telephone call to him at 1:30 
a.m. for assistance, Serafini called back to tell him "that 
everything was in place." Neither Drazdowski, an 
accountant, nor Dr. Zaloga claim that Serafini personally 
made the guarantee; nor does the defendant. Ther e is no 
information how the guarantee was accomplished, to whom 
it was made, who made it, and the substance of the 
guarantee, or the relationship between Dr . Zaloga and the 
defendant. The majority believes this assistance"is hardly 
part of the normal duties of a local politician." On the other 
hand, the entirely obscure and mysterious incident may 
very well have its genesis in defendant's political agenda. In 
any event, it hardly rises to the level of significant 
community service. 
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The Seig letter attests to Serafini's offer to employ Seig, a 
young friend of the family, on the defendant's legislative 
staff, a loan to him of an unstated sum of money, and 
encouragement to Seig to attend college. The thir d letter 
reports a personal check of $750 from the defendant to a 
widow who was about to lose her home through foreclosure. 
The widow expressed doubt about her ability to repay and 
defendant insisted she need not do so unless able. 
 
These three "noteworthy" letters do r eflect commendable 
action by the defendant, but neither they, nor the other 
letters, show community service to an exceptional or 
extraordinary degree. A few acts of personal kindness to 
individual friends do not add up to community service; they 
do not fulfill the purpose of the Guidelines. The District 
Court relied considerably on the defendant's gift "of time." 
I can find no evidence of the amount of time given to 
community service, as distinguished from some personal 
favors to friends and political constituents. 
 
The Guidelines do not suggest a sentence departur e for 
time spent aiding friends or family, or time in per forming 
acts of kindness -- even unusual acts of kindness to 
individuals. Construing such personal acts to individuals 
as exceptional community service under the Guidelines 
opens up an area as vast and deep as the Seven Seas. The 
Guidelines speak in terms of community service and there 
is nothing in the record of this case that definitively shows 
Serafini gave community service, independent of his 
political activities. The 1999 Statistical Abstract of the 
United States reveals that in the year 1995, persons in the 
United States with income of $100,000 or mor e contributed 
an average of 4.4 hours per week to volunteer work without 
monetary pay. In this case, although Serafini ear ned many 
times more than $100,000 in 1994 and 1995, we have no 
record that he gave any amount of time to volunteer work, 
whether it was for one or more weeks during the year, or for 
fifty-two weeks. 
 
The cases support the foregoing analysis. Courts may not 
leniently interpret the requirement of extraordinary 
circumstances to grant a downward departur e. See, e.g., 
United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(Defendant was a highly-decorated Vietnam veteran, had 
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saved an innocent civilian during the My Lai massacr e, and 
had served with the Secret Service; these deeds did not 
warrant a departure); United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 
244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990)(Defendant's work history, family 
ties and responsibilities, and extensive contribution to the 
town's economic well-being could not justify downwar d 
departure.) 
 
United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1998), 
contains factual similarities to this case, particularly with 
respect to the defendant's socioeconomic status. In 
commenting upon the defendant's commendable r ecord as 
a neighbor and good friend who advised local business 
owners, hired young people, served on his chur ch council 
and raised money for charity, the court ther e also noted 
that the defendant's annual income exceeded $500,000. 
The court found that it was "neither exceptional nor out of 
the ordinary for someone of the defendant's income and 
preeminence" in his small community to engage in 
charitable works and community services of this nature." 
Id. at 630. The majority here notes, maj. op. at 26, that the 
Morken court found that given Morken's station in life, his 
contributions were not extraordinary. Her e, Serafini's 
annual income over the years was substantially higher than 
Morken's, and for several years prior to his indictment, was 
almost double. Serafini's contributions, like Morken's, were 
not exceptional or out of the ordinary. Serafini's 
contributions were even less exceptional, considering his 
much larger income and preeminence. 
 
We have no information of recor d of time spent by 
Serafini in behalf of fund raising efforts or other services of 
the United Way or the colleges and other community service 
organizations in his county. In United States v. Crouse, 145 
F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 1998) the defendant, Crouse, served on 
the boards of various community organizations over many 
years. In commenting on his service in connection with his 
request for sentencing departure, the court of appeals 
observed: 
 
       Crouse's community works, while found to be 
       significant by the District Court, are not unusual for a 
       prominent businessman. Examples of Crouse's 
       community involvement include church activities; 
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       service on the boards of various community 
       organizations, including a local hospital, the United 
       Way, and regional airport authority; and his 
       membership and active involvement with the Rotary 
       Club. These examples of community involvement 
       spanned over at least a 25-year period. 
 
Crouse, 145 F.3d at 792. 
 
Measured by any reasonable standar d, whether it be 
tithing to his church and community, or other charitable 
contributions of money or community time, Serafini's 
charitable and community service was far from exceptional 
or extraordinary. It was quite ordinary for a man in his 
preeminent position and financial cir cumstances. Nor were 
his charitable contributions or community services of the 
level or character exacting personal sacrifice, a deprivation 
of something of substance because of his contributions.3 
 
I therefore conclude that it was imper missible under the 
Guidelines for the District Court to depart fr om the 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. According to Laurie Nieb, Coordinator for the Archdiocese Office of 
Stewardship in Denver, Colorado, sacrificial giving means "a gift that 
impacts your life; give from your sustenance, not your abundance." The 
Denver Post, October 21, 1999, Section A , pg. A-01. 
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